PENNSYLVANIA LEGAL UPDATE
FALL 1999 ISSUE

Generally, landowners owe no duty to trespassers except to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring them. Pennsylvania law treats trespassing children differently. Landowners and those who occupy land under leases can be held responsible for injuries to children caused by dangerous "artificial" conditions of land that attract children. Sometimes referred to as "attractive nuisances," such conditions are not natural features of the land, such as streams or cliffs, or trees that can be climbed. Instead, an artificial condition is man-made, such as a building, a construction site, a piece of heavy equipment, or even a man-made ditch.

Every artificial condition is not necessarily an attractive nuisance. Only where the owner knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass and only when the artificial condition has the potential to cause death or serious bodily injury does an attractive nuisance exist at law. A landowner can be held responsible for injuries suffered by children if the landowner could have eliminated the danger without significant burden and he or she did not exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect the children. Finally, attractive nuisance liability is imposed on a landowner only if a child's youth was a factor in his or her not realizing the risks involved.

Attractive nuisance liability has been found where children were injured when the wall on which they were playing at a construction site collapsed, where a child was struck by a rolling gas cylinder when the child was playing near a loading platform, where children regularly trespassed through a gated fence onto a railroad track, and where a child was injured in an abandoned quarry.

Landowners who have any reason to believe children are trespassing should treat this problem with the highest concern if there are any potentially dangerous artificial conditions on the land. Posting both written notices against trespassing and written warnings of danger may be sensible measures to warn and protect potential adult trespassers, but posted notices are of little effect where children are involved.

As far as is practicably possible, children's access to dangerous conditions should be prevented. The securing of construction sites, work equipment, ditches, and buildings is crucial. Gates that can be opened by children or fences that can be easily climbed are not considered adequate security by the courts. A landowner who takes appropriate cautionary measures should consider keeping a written memorandum of what has been done.

Under Pennsylvania law, parents must support their children until the children reach the age of 18. However, a Pennsylvania couple was recently held responsible for paying psychiatric and hospital bills for treatment provided to their young adult daughter, a college student over the age of 18. The daughter suffered from cerebral palsy and was treated by a hospital and a psychiatrist for depression associated with her condition. When her bills went unpaid and mounted, the psychiatrist and the hospital sued the parents.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court held the parents responsible for paying the bills. First, the court noted that the parents had previously paid the psychiatrist and had provided him with insurance coverage information regarding their daughter. Because the parents never advised the psychiatrist of their decision to stop paying their daughter's bills, the psychiatrist was entitled to expect continued payments.

Second, and more significantly, the court noted that parents have a legal duty in Pennsylvania to support a child who has a physical or mental condition that exists at the time the child reaches 18 and that prevents the child from becoming self-supporting. Children whose physical or mental conditions limit their ability to support themselves are considered "unemancipated" and are entitled to extended support. When an unemancipated, disabled child accepts goods or services from businesses or medical providers, parents can be held directly responsible for paying those businesses or medical providers.

Just how extended this support must be, for what period of time, at what amount, and under what limitations remains unclear. What is certain is that a child who achieves his or her majority with physical or mental limitations that prevent him or her from employment is entitled to some continued parental support. A parent of an adult disabled child should be sure to stay aware of the child's dealings with creditors. If a parent pays a bill for the child, he or she should advise the creditor of whether future payments can be expected from the parent.

When a Pennsylvania landlord commenced eviction proceedings against his tenants, they called the local electric company and arranged for disconnection of the electric service before leaving the premises. Because the tenants were the "ratepayers," i.e., the individuals who had arranged for the electric service and who were responsible for paying the bills, the electric company disconnected the rental home from all electric service. At the time the service was disconnected, the outdoor temperature was below freezing. Since the home-heating system depended on the electric service, the house froze throughout and substantial water damage resulted from multiple ruptures of the plumbing system.

The landlord sued the electric company for failing to notify him before they disconnected the electric service. The landlord's suit against the electric company went all the way to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, where the electric company won.

Pennsylvania law closely regulates the termination of public utilities. Electric companies cannot terminate service on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays, or certain specified holidays. Consumers are entitled to 10 days' notice before termination. The electric company must attempt to make personal contact with the consumer before terminating service. From December 1 to March 31, electric companies may not terminate electric service related to home heating unless the provision of service causes an actual danger or unless the company secures special permission from the Public Utility Commission.

In this case, the landlord's problem was that the electric service was not "terminated"-it was "disconnected." Disconnection of service at the request of the ratepayer is not surrounded by the same safeguards as is termination of service by the electric company. When an electric company terminates its service, its rights are limited by the consumer protection laws described above. Additionally, when terminating service, the company owes notice to the landlord. But in this case, the landlord's tenants legally were considered the "residents" in the home, and because they alone were the "ratepayers" the company was entitled to disconnect the service at their request without any notice to the landlord.

Some electric companies have a "landlord/tenant agreement" through which landlords can agree automatically to assume the responsibility for payment of the electric service if the tenants request disconnection of the service. Some electric companies may follow a policy of notifying landlords in regard to both terminations and disconnections. But, as this recent case clearly shows, there is no obligation on the part of an electric company to notify a landlord where residential tenants request disconnection of their electric service.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently clarified two fundamental rules of traffic safety. The "assured clear distance ahead rule" requires that a driver must at all times be able to bring his or her vehicle to a stop within the distance that he or she can clearly see, or, as it is sometimes stated, "within the distance of whatever may reasonably be anticipated." Compliance with this rule requires that drivers use extra care on curves, hill crests, and narrow or winding roadways. It also requires that drivers pay careful attention to traffic and weather hazards.

The assured clear distance ahead rule sometimes conflicts with the "sudden emergency doctrine." The sudden emergency doctrine is a defense for a driver who suddenly and unexpectedly finds himself or herself confronted with a perilous situation that permits little or no opportunity to react. Where a sudden emergency confronts a driver, he or she is not expected to exercise the usual degree of care or even the best judgment. Instead, the driver experiencing a sudden emergency must only use "honest judgment." It is important to note that only those who are driving carefully and prudently are entitled to the sudden emergency defense.

In clarifying the clash between the two rules, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently ruled that drivers defending against negligence lawsuits are entitled to raise the sudden emergency doctrine unless there is evidence that clearly establishes that they violated the assured clear distance ahead rule.

A Pennsylvania landlord was recently ordered to pay $11,790 to tenants he evicted. The payment was ordered as reimbursement to the tenants for repairs and improvements the tenants made to the rental home. The Pennsylvania court's decision was based on the legal theory of "unjust enrichment."

Unjust enrichment is a doctrine that arises from the most basic legal principle of fundamental fairness. When work or services are performed by one party and accepted by another under circumstances where payment fairly can be expected, the doctrine of unjust enrichment applies. However, the doctrine only applies to situations where one party's gain or benefit would be unjust-the simple fact that one party has benefited from the work or services of the other is not enough.

An exception to the doctrine of unjust enrichment exists in cases involving persons related by blood or marriage. If a close family relationship exists between the parties, the courts will presume that the goods or services given by one party to the other were given without any expectation of payment. Also, the doctrine of unjust enrichment cannot be used by a person who is unhappy with the terms of a contract. Where an oral or written contract exists, the contract itself will control the rights and obligations of the parties. But where there is no contract, or where the contract's terms do not clearly provide for payment, a party who sues for payment can raise the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

In the case under discussion, the lease term was month-to-month. In a month-to-month lease, generally either party is free to terminate the lease with notice of only one month or less. The tenants claimed that in addition to the written lease terms they had an understanding with the landlord that they could live in the house "for as long as they continued to pay rent." The lease terms required very low rent in the first four years of the lease, followed by a slight increase in rent during the next four years. In the first three years of the lease, the tenants made substantial improvements to the home, adding two new bathrooms, carpeting the floors, installing a new septic system and furnace, rewiring the entire house, constructing two new porches, and painting the exterior of the home. There was no agreement between the parties about the improvements.

Seven years after the lease was signed, the landlord gave the tenants 15 days' notice of his intention to terminate the lease. The tenants had not breached the lease in any way. The tenants sued for reimbursement for the extensive improvements they had made to the home. The court found that, because the tenants had a reasonable and good-faith expectation of a long-term occupancy of the home and because the landlord knew they were making improvements to the home, the tenants were entitled to reimbursement under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The court ruled that it would be unconscionable for the landlord to retain the benefit of a dwelling "completely transformed" from a dilapidated old structure into a greatly improved, marketable home.

In requiring the landlord to reimburse the tenants, the court found that the tenants' claims to an unlimited right to live in the house as long as they paid rent amounted to a claim to a life estate title. This case may herald an expansion of the doctrine of unjust enrichment in matters of residential real estate. In future Pennsylvania cases, tenants who have an expectation of an unlimited lease term may be treated as holding a life estate or an expectancy of title.

In light of this recent case, landlords who are pleased with their tenants should be cautious about giving oral assurances that the lease will never be terminated. Additionally, landlords should establish a clear understanding with tenants who undertake to make major improvements to the leased property. A clear, written directive that no reimbursements will be made or can be expected will provide landlords with valuable protection against a later finding of unjust enrichment.

In 1966, the United States Supreme Court in the Miranda case established a set of warnings that all law enforcers must give to people interrogated while in custody. Prior to any questioning, individuals in custody must be warned that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say can be used against them in a court of law, that they have the right to the presence of an attorney, and that, if they cannot afford an attorney, one can be appointed prior to any questioning. Suspects are only entitled to Miranda warnings if they are in custody at the time that they are questioned.

The Pennsylvania courts look at all of the surrounding circumstances in each case to determine if police action toward a person resulted in the person's being in police custody. "Custody" can occur even when there is no formal arrest. The courts examine whether the person in question could have reasonably believed that he or she was not free to leave and was being interrogated. The length of the interview, its location, whether the police transported the person any distance, and the tone and nature of the questioning are all factors considered by the courts.

When a Pennsylvania business lost over $200,000, the owners claimed that their bookkeeper had stolen the money. In their investigation, the Pennsylvania State Police questioned the bookkeeper on several occasions. In the second interview, the bookkeeper confessed to the theft. Later, she tried to have her written confession declared illegal because she was not given Miranda warnings by the detectives.

The Pennsylvania court found that the bookkeeper was not subjected to custodial interrogation. The court noted that she was in her home and that she was told that she did not have to admit the police or answer their questions. Because the detectives told her that they would leave upon her request and because she walked freely about the house serving coffee and tea, taking personal telephone calls, and smoking, the court found that her freedom was not substantially limited.

Not every individual or suspect interviewed by the police is entitled to Miranda warnings. Only where a person is interrogated while in custody do the protections of the Miranda case apply. Statements freely made to investigating law enforcement officers by persons not in custody are admissible in court.